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Abstract:  
In the tariff growth debate, especially for  Europe late XIX century,  the important question 
is:  was protection a successful policy to foster industrialization? Total tariff average  may not only 
provide little information  for interpreting the tariff mechanism causation to growth but perhaps an 
erroneous one. This paper try to make more explicit the relation between industrial, agricultural 
and fiscal tariffs to clear the mechanism of causation between tariffs and growth. The good 
reputation of late 19th century European protectionism is questioned in this paper. First results 
show a negative relationship between tariffs and growth in Europe despite is founded a relevant  
disparities between total and manufacture tariff association with growth in Core and Peripheral 
European countries. In one side, rich European countries growth is associated with total tariff but 
not with manufacture tariff increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans countries growth appear 
negatively associated either with total than with manufacture tariff increase. 
 
 
 
Traditionally many authors have supported the idea that protection was instrumental to the 
development of Continental Europe in the late nineteenth century 
1
.   Bairoch hypothesis that 
tariffs were positively associated with growth is related mainly with European countries but has 
been extended also to the rich European Offshoots. The positive correlation founded recently by 
O´Rourcke (2000)  strength Bairoch`s suggestion,  that tariffs may have played a causal role in 
promoting growth in the years previous to First World War. Such a positive impression has been 
questioned recently by Irving (2002) arguing  that the tariff-growth  correlation is specially 
influenced by the country sample used by O`Rourke.  Rapid Growth of high tariffs land abundance 
countries  like , USA, Canada and Argentina and Australia  was probably caused more by strong 
imports of capital than by protection policies
2
.  High tariffs in those countries with low land- 
population ratios was probably explained more by trade tax dependence than for an import 
                                                 
1
  For Europe many authors, like  Milward –Saul (1977),  Pollard (1982)  but  notably Bairoch (1976, 1989, 1996) and 
recently  the already mentioned  work by O`Rourke (2000) and Clemens Williamson (2001) implicitly sustain this 
position for the period 1875 -1914. “Although import substitution policies have gradually lost their shine over the 
postwar period, their reputation has remained intact for the late nineteenth century” (Irwin (2001) p. 1  
2
 O´Rourcke (2000). data set cover ten countries, three in the New World (Australia, Canada, and USA) and seven in 
Europe (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK). Irving (2002) Figure 1 present only an 
unconditional relation between average tariffs in 1870 and per capita growth rates between 1870-1913,for a similar 
sample  with Canada, Argentina,  and USA emerging as clear high growth- high tariffs outliers. Correlation without 
these countries fall from 0,68 to 0,08. 
  
 3 
substitution strategy 
3
 . More over,  even in Europe, tariffs average measures used for correlation 
equations (costume  revenue divided by imports) may not be a good indicator of a country`s trade 
policy, because revenue-generating tariffs (imposed on a few exotic products)  represent a relevant 
and changing share of total costume revenue in Europe late 19th century.  Fiscal tariffs imposed on 
exotic products have a much smaller impact on welfare and on import substitution than tariffs 
designed to protect domestic production 
4
.  
Second criticism came in terms of regional asymmetry in tariff-growth behaviour. 
Clements &Williamson (2001) support Bairoch suggestion that protection was associated with fast 
growth before World War II but they think that this association is weak and negative in the poor 
periphery. 
5
  
Last but not least criticism came from the USA tariff story. Delong(1998), and Irwin 
(2000) suggest that the central question to investigate is on how did  the tariff affect  the process 
and direction of capital accumulation?  Irwin (2002) suggest that, for late 19
th
 century Europe, the 
main channel to explain the tariffs growth mechanism is the potential encouraging structural 
change from agriculture to industry to raise output per worker. Tariffs may accelerate the 
movement from low-productivity agricultural workers into higher-productivity manufacturing 
jobs
6
.  
This paper discusses the main criticisms that make the use of the average tariff indicator to 
establish a causal relationship between tariffs and growth in late 19
th
 century Europe especially 
vulnerable. Total tariff average may not only provide little information for interpreting the tariff 
mechanism causation to growth but perhaps an erroneous one. Historical events as agricultural 
protection reaction in the aftermath of the Great grain invasion (O`Rourke (1997), European 
                                                 
3
 The main departure assumption is that, for a given government demand revenue, trade taxes generates bigger 
efficiency distortion than income taxes. So the second is preferable to the first but it is not implemented because there 
are higher collection cost for income taxes than for trade taxes. Eastery&Rebelo(1993) employ” historical data” for 28 
countries from 1870-1988 and recent cross-section data for 100 countries 1970-1988, their main findings are (P.417):  
there is a strong association between development level and fiscal structure: poor countries rely heavily on 
international  trade taxes and its  share is significant influenced by the scale of the economy, measured by its 
population; even if you control by income and share of trade in GNP. In the same line Irwin (2002) p.168,  argues that: 
“Land-abundant countries tended to impose high tariffs  for public finance and for political-economy reasons. In terms 
of public finance, import taxed made sense for countries with low population densities. Other means of raising 
revenue (excise taxes, land taxes, income taxed, etc.) were not feasible or as enforceable in countries with a widely 
dispersed population, particularly in late 19
th
 century.” 
 
4
  Tena (2001, 2005) offers evidence of the strong and changing presence of the so-called fiscal products in total tariff 
revenues in central and peripheral Europe and its implications for 19th century comparative European trade policy. 
 
5
  Clements &Williamson (2001)p. 10 “finally, tariffs had a negative impact on growth in the European Periphery (-
0,17 before war and -0,52 after)” . Tariff growth regional asymmetry behavior  has been looked out recently for late 
20
th
 century decades  in the other way around see Dejonj –Ripoll (2005).   
 
6
  Assuming that Industrial tariff may exerts two contradictory effects on growth. First, emphasizes by import 
substitutions views, pulling resources into the manufacturing sector, it enlarge the scope for dynamic scale benefits, 
thereby increasing growth. Second, emphasizes by free traders views, imposing a static efficiency loss, the cost of 
which rises over the time as the inefficient manufacturing sector becomes larger. 
 
 4 
Offshoots trade tax dependence or the big share of exotic tariff goods in total tariff revenue in rich 
European countries between 1870 to 1914 ( Tena 2001, 2005 ), suggest the use of alternative 
indicators to the conventional total tariff average in tariff growth correlation equation or even for 
unconditional association. If we accept that the relevant question for Europe late nineteenth 
century, is:  was protection a successful policy to foster industrialization? Then we should be more 
interested in the correlation between industrial tariff average and total factor productivity increase. 
GDP per person growth has probably a good correlation with total productivity increase in the 
long run, but perhaps total tariff average is not a good proxy for an industrial protection strategy.  
 
This paper will use two sets of  industrial tariffs data: first Bairoch`s (1989)  and League of 
Nations(1927) estimations of manufacture tariff levels for 15 European countries in 1875  and 
1913 respectively. Second a new data sets on prices and tariffs of 25-34 manufactures products in 
13-17 European countries constructed for two benchmarks years 1875 and 1902 complementing 
British Board of trade work for those years. The paper will present two samples of countries, Core 
and Periphery, according to income level
7.
  First results show a negative relationship between 
tariffs and growth in Europe, despite is founded a relevant  disparities between total and 
manufacture tariff association with growth in Core and Peripheral European countries. In one side, 
rich European countries growth is associated with total tariff but not with manufacture tariff 
increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans countries growth appear negatively associated 
either with total than with manufacture tariff increase. 
 
 
1. European  protectionism and the tariff growth debate. 
What impact had protection in the late nineteenth century? Is a question with a no easy 
answer, but the accumulating evidence came mostly from the European trade  history. Literature 
and recent research explain the roots of the international “return to protection” in the European 
response to the arrival of New World and Russian cheap grain to European markets, from 1870 
onwards, because  of falling transport cost. The impact of falling agrarian prices in the New World 
and in Europe has been studied by Harley (1978, 1980) O`Rourke (1997) O`Rourke- Williamson 
(1999). Notably Barioch (1976, 1989,1996) has extensively studied the European Continent 
reaction assuming that it was relevant and instrumental for development of Continental Europe, 
but he put the emphasis more in the Continental reaction against manufacture British competition 
than in the “agrarian invasion”. It is truth that Protection backlash should not be separated from a 
more general European nationalist reaction to the new globalization period and their influence on 
                                                 
7
  Core European countries are defined according to Maddison (1995): those that in 1870 had  GDP per Capita  
(international 1990 dollars)  equal or superior to France (Core: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,  Germany, 
Netherland, Switzerland, UK) that had 56% of  the UK level (the next Sweden  with the 50%). Peripheral countries the 
rest (ordered by income): Sweden, Italy, Spain, Norway, Hungary, Portugal, Russia.  
 5 
new nationalist rethoric had on presure groups and parliaments alliances or even in long swing 
political events (Polard (1982). Nevertheless, some authors like Capie thinks that “the extent of 
protection, however, turns out to have been less than is often suggested, and the impact on 
economic growth is found to have been trivial” Capie (1994), p.6. Only recently, the European 
tariff backlash has been contextualized inside the behavior of the world protection tariff reaction. 
The new measures offered  by Clements-Williamson (2001) show a very moderate reaction on 
average of rich Europe (France, Germany and UK) in contrast with peripheral poor Europe
8
.  
 
 
      Figure 1 
Unweighted Tariff Average of Core and Peripheral European Countries 1855-1913 
with and without Fiscal Tariffs 
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Sources: Tena (2005) 
 
 
Figure 1 confirm and extend the Clements Williamson (2001) evidence supporting 
European regional asymmetry tariff backlash between Peripheral and Core Countries
9
.   
Conventional tariff average would show how European return to protection against globalization 
was more a poor than a rich country experience. European poor countries tariff level double the 
rich one`s in the late sixties and early seventies and late seventies reaction was earlier and stronger 
than in the rich Europe. Exotic products revenue represented a bigger share in total dutiable 
                                                 
8
 Clemens Williamson (2001) only include US as a non European country in the 4 members of the industrial core 
(France, Germany, UK and USA) and  10 European Periphery (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain , Sweden).  
9
 Figure ,1 tariff average, are estimated as the unweighted average of the countries mentioned. First as the ratio of  
total tariff revenue between total imports and second excluding of that ratio revenue and imports  of the  exotic 
products in every country  (sugar, coffe, tobacco and cacao). For Sources and procedure in the individual countries see 
Appendix 2 Tena (2005).  
 6 
imports in the European Core than in the Periphery. European Core tariff level  without fiscals is 
even lower but the return to protection is better defined and adapted to the well known qualitative 
commercial history, at least for the case of France and Germany. Rich European protection was 
moderate and because of that very influenced by the exotic product tariffs imposed by fiscal 
reason. On the contrary much heavy protected Periphery appear more close to an import 
substitution strategy and probably in these countries protection was more relevant for growth. 
 
    Figure 2 
Association between total tariff level in 1875  and 1870-1913 growth 
in European Core 
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Figure 3 
 Association between total tariff level in 1875 and 1870-1913 growth 
in European Periphery
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 7 
 
In theory, there is more room for a positive protection impact on growth in countries with a 
bigger agricultural sector a higher productivity differential from traditional to industrial sector.  
The positive association between total tariff average and growth showed for rich European 
countries and the negative showed by poor Europe respectively in Figure 2 and 3 are apparently 
contra intuitive
10
.  Initial rich European low tariff levels were positive associated with growth (R
2
= 
0.52, without UK R
2
= 0.65), and poor European countries with high tariff levels have a clear 
negative association with growth (R
2
= 0.77, without Hungary R
2
= 0.87).   Bairoch´s hypothesis on 
tariffs fostering Continental Europe industrialization at the end of nineteenth  century appear not to 
holds up for peripheral European countries. But we do not know if the positive association is 
because moderate tariffs were irrelevant or because core European countries protected more the 
higher productive sectors with bigger impact on growth.  
 
 
Figure 4 
 Association  between manufacture tariff levels in 1875 and growth 1870- 
1913 in European Core Countries
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10
 Dejonj –Ripoll (2005)  using tariff average –growth equations for the period 1975-2000 (60 countries ) find  that the 
marginal impact of tariffs on growth is declining in income. Moreover, evidence of a negative relationship between 
tariffs and growth is apparent only among the world’s rich countries. 
 
 8 
     Figure 5     
 
 Association between manufactures tariff level in 1875 and growth 1870-
1913 in European Peripheral countries
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Figure 4 and 5 associate Paul Bairoch estimations of manufacture tariff average in 1875 
with tariff growth for the same groups of countries. Rich European countries positive association 
is lower that for total average very low but still is remained at the same time that the negative 
strong association between manufacture tariffs and growth is confirmed for the poor European 
countries. So, In one side, rich European countries growth is associated with total tariff but not 
with manufacture tariff increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans countries growth appear 
negatively associated either with total than with manufacture tariff increase. In the next section we 
will try to introduce new evidence and arguments to clarify this puzzle on the tariff growth 
mechanism.  
 
 
 
2. European industrial tariff policy.  
 
The triumph of protection in Continental Europe was very largely the result of a coalition 
of interest between farmers, disappointed with lowering grain prices, and industrialist who had 
never been convinced of the advantage of competing with British manufactures. Industry in Poor 
Continental Europe during the short period of fifteen years that follow the Cobden –Chevalier free 
trade period did not enjoyed really from tariff disarmament. It is true that countries political 
situation in Europe were very different and in consequence liberalism went over at different speeds 
around Europe.  Bairoch (1989) does not pay attention to the industrial tariff levels in relation with 
economical or Institutional development. This paper has used the only comparative manufacture 
 9 
tariff level estimation available for 19
th
 century estimated by Bairoch for the year 1875. As 
Appendix B show Portugal appear as the most manufacture protected country in Europe with a 
tariff average around 20-25 per cent followed by  Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Russia and  Spain 
with levels around 15-20 percent. From Peripheral Europe only Norway and Sweden would appear 
with low levels around 4 per cent.  France with 12-15 per cent level almost three fold Germany 
and  Italian 4-6 per cent levels, the last being presented as one the few big European countries that 
enjoined a real free trade period. As expected, small rich countries ( with the exception of Belgium 
with a 9-10%) appear with a very low manufacture protection. Manufacture tariff reaction in the 
1880´s and 1890´s  was probably very different and disperse all around Europe. We only have a 
qualitative picture from the literature because there are not accurate estimations comparable along 
the time before and after the years of return of protection.  
 
Table 1 
Manufacture tariff average in Europe 1875-1902 
 1875 (a) 1876(b) 1902 (b) 1913 © 
 Manufacture  Manufacture Manufacture Manufact 
 Bairoch  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweigted 
       
Austria  15-20% 24% 12% 36% 28% 18% 
Belgium 9-10% 10% 6% 13% 9% 10% 
Denmark 15-20% 16% 10% 20% 16% 14% 
France 12-15% 23% 13% 33% 29% 16% 
Germany 4-7% 15% 7% 26% 21% 10% 
Holland 3-5% 3% 2% 3% 2% 4% 
Switzerland    7% 7% 9% 
EU Core 11,00% 15% 8% 20% 16% 12% 
       
       
Hungary 15-20% 24% 12% 36% 28% 18% 
Italy 8-10% 17% 10% 27% 24% 15% 
Norway 2-4% 13% 6% 14% 11%  
Portugal 20-25% 34% 31% 75% 88%  
Roumania    13% 13% 26% 
Rusia 15-20% 69% 38% 144% 118%  
Spain 15-20% 53% 32% 77% 68% 43% 
Sweden 3-5% 17% 9% 24% 20% 25% 
EU Periphery 13% 33% 20% 51% 46% 25% 
Sources: (a): Bairoch (1989) Table 5 p.42. (b): Apendix A. (c): Also export prices from Liepman (1938) 
Table IV A, p.413, with the exception of Austria, Denmark and Holland that cane from League of Nations 
(1927) B1 p.15 (also export prices). 
 
In previous figures we have used Bairoch`s  estimation  of manufacture tariff levels for 15 
European countries in 1875 to construct two samples of countries, Core and Periphery, according 
 10 
to their income level
11
.  In Table 1 we follow the same classification using the new estimations of 
manufacture tariff average developed in Appendix A, for 1876 and 1902 and  Liepman(1938) and 
League of Nations (1927) for 1913. Estimation for 1876 and 1902 use export prices weighted or 
unweighted by british export extending Board of Trade first estimation and comparable with the 
1913 estimations, that use too export prices.  The use of export fob prices in tariff average has the 
inconvenient of producing higher higher tariff levels than the conventional tariff average estimated 
using cif import values. The virtue of this system is that export prices represent better free trade 
prices than import unit values estimated after tariff distortion on domestic prices.  The new 
estimations of manufacture tariff average levels offered by 1876 are very different from those of 
Bairoch but offer a quite similar ranking order from more to less protected countries.  
 
 
Figure 6 
Unweighted Manufacture Tariff Average  in Core and Peripheral Europe
 1876-1902-1913
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Sources:  Table 1. Unweighted column . 
 
 
Figure 6 show how manufacture protection in rich and poor European countries follow a 
similar trend than it was discussed for total protection in Figure 1.  Manufacture protection in the 
1870´s was much more important in Peripheral than core countries. Most of the poor countries 
perhaps with the exception or Norway, Italy and Sweden, had not disarmed their manufacture 
tariff barriers during the short free trade period that followed the Anglo-French treaty.  Industrial 
lobbies coalition with agrarian interest consolidate nationalism and protection all around Europe 
but especially in poor countries. In the early 1890`s most of the countries had approved already 
complex tariff laws as the epilogue of and extended trade wars and definitive abandonment of the 
“most favourite country clause”.  Rich countries point of departure manufacture tariff average was 
                                                 
11
  See note 7. 
 11 
almost one third the level of the peripheral countries but backlash against globalization is recorded 
by figure 6 as an increment of two fold the 8 per cent tariff average of the 1870¨s, meanwhile 
Peripheral countries reacted even stronger, increasing more than two fold their high 20 per cent 
level of the 1870`s. The extended  specific tariff method in Continental Europe allowed important 
reduction in tariff levels from the later 1890´s because consistent increase trend in international 
prices of agrarian and manufacture products from the second half of the 1890´s to 1913. Even if 
parliaments and new tariffs laws were approved during the first years of the 20
th
 century, price 
increase produced, with the exception of some new sectors developed during the of the second 
industrial revolution, a generalised reduction in protection especially in Poor European countries.  
 
3. European Manufacture protection and Growth 
For late 19
th
 century Europe, a first channel to explain the tariff - growth mechanism is the 
potential encouraging of structural change from agriculture to industry to raise output per worker. 
Tariffs may accelerate the movement from agriculture to industry to raise output per worker into 
higher-productivity manufacturing jobs. A second channel is proposed by Williamson (1974, p. 
657), for the case of USA, arguing that industrial tariffs may have had a positive impact on growth 
because industrial tariffs at the end of 19
th
 century taxed mainly final manufacture goods leaving 
out the protection of finished capital goods that were rarely traded in this period
12
.  Nowadays 
tariffs lower the growth rate, in part by making investment goods such as equipment and 
machinery relative more expensive: since they are largely traded across international frontiers an in 
consequence protected. In late 19
th
 century manufacture tariffs lowered the price of construction 
and investment relative to heavily tariffed manufactured or agriculture products with the results 
that more resources were devoted to investment. De Long (1998, p. 370) for the case of USA say 
that “Thus, tariffs on imported capital goods could have proven very harmful to capital 
accumulation and economic growth”
13
 
There are very few reliable comparative studies on relative protection between agricultural 
and manufactures or total tariff average before 1913
14
. So before 1913 we only can make very rude 
an speculative hypothesis as those derived from Table 1 of the Appendix B.  
Table 1 of the Appendix   use  Bairoch (1989)  and Liepman (1938) manufacture tariff average  
estimations for the respective years of  1875 and 1913 in relation with total average
15
.  Apparently, 
                                                 
12
 This argument is also cited by O´Rourke (2000). On the contrary De Long (1998) argues that in USA late 19
th
 
century capital goods were traded and taxed at roughtly the same rate as final manufacture products.  
 
13
 Collins and Williamson (1999) report regressions that indicate higher tariffs were associated with lower relative 
prices of capital goods in a panel of countries prior to 1950 (although they report that this finding is not robust to the 
exclusion of the United States). 
  
14
 This study estimate weighted and unweighted manufacture tariff average using british export prices and results are 
not comparable with the classical total  tariff average estimated as the ratio of tariff revenues between import values. 
For a comparative study  using the same method for years before 1913 see Table 2 of the Appendix for Spain and 
Italy. For 1913 and the interwar period we have the Liepman (1938) and League of Nations(1927) well known studies. 
 12 
in the first half of 1870´s, before the years of return to protection, rich European countries  had a 
remarkable more protected manufactured sector than the rest of the economy. Amazing, relative 
manufacture protection in the same years in the European periphery was in the other way around.   
Even if the data, showed in table 3, have serious comparability problems, it suggest that rich 
European countries relative manufacture tariffs ratio was reduced from 1870´s to First War World.  
What this crude  ratio evolution may show?  a) That the stimulus of  industrial protection  to shift 
resources out of agriculture and into manufacturing was reduced during the years of return of 
protection in most rich European countries? b) That the ratio between manufacture tariffs and  
primary product tariffs worsened  because some primary products tariffs used by fiscal reasons 
increased faster than the rest agricultural and industrial duties. Figure 1 offer some support to the 
b) hypothesis but data is very weak and provisional to go further on this grounds.  
Following the second channel, What may be said on the relative protection levels between 
investment and consumer manufactures during the period of return to protection?  
 
Table 2 
Finished and Investment Manufacture protection in Core and Peripheral European 
Countries in 1902 
European Core 1902 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Holand Switzerland 
Manufacture Protection 
Weighted 36% 13% 20% 33% 26% 3% 7% 
COTTON MANUFACTURES 55% 25% 33% 46% 44% 5% 10% 
IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURES 43% 5% 10% 32% 18% 0% 5% 
MACHINARY HARDWARE &c 15% 3% 6% 9% 8% 0% 5% 
        
 
European Pheriphery 1902 Italy Norway Portugal  Roumania Russia Spain Sweden 
MANUFACTURE PROTECTION 
WEIGHTED 27% 14% 75% 13% 144% 77% 24% 
COTTON MANUFACTURES 37% 25% 89% 17% 228% 118% 39% 
IRON AND STEEL 
MANUFACTURES 38% 0% 5% 5% 91% 40% 7% 
MACHINARY HARDWARE &c 10% 0% 8% 0% 26% 17% 10% 
        
Sources: Appendix A, Table 5 and 6 
 
For 1876 even if we have some evidence that machinery was internationally traded 
it is true that the amount of trade in relation with other finished manufacture was very low. 
So our extended estimation from the British  Board of Trade only offer data on steel and 
chemical products but not on machinary. Other disperse works offer data on comparing 
                                                                                                                                                                
15
  Manufacture tariff average of  Bairoch and  Liepman are not  directly comparable across the time because they use 
different methodology. Bairoch estimation  use a sample of 14 different manufactured products duties in 1875 
weighted by import values average of 1869-71(as usual he is not much more  explicit about his estimations). Liepman  
methodology is very well known. He use a simple average of 61 manufactured products in 1913 over  export prices  in 
the same year . On the contrary the ratio between  Manufacture and total tariff average in each period is perfectly 
comparable because both follow a similar methodology with some explicit exceptions in 1913. 
 13 
protection levels in finished and investment manufactures for 1877 for Spain and Italy that 
corroborate the more protected finished than investment manufacture in protectionist 
countries like Spain
16
.  Table 2 shows that for the turn of the century, when increment in 
protection was around its highest levels, machinery was much less protected than the total 
or cotton manufacture (still the most important consumer manufacture internationally 
traded).  This happens as much to Periphery than to Core countries, so evidence show a low 
level of tariffs on machinery manufactures in relation with finished manufactures all 
around Europe before and after the years of return to protection. So in case that we would 
find a positive correlation between manufacture tariffs and growth this is a potential 
channel to explain a positive mechanism connection between tariffs and growth. We have 
not found a significant difference in the structure of manufacture protection between rich 
and poor countries and in consequence tariff manufacture structure do not appear as a good 
explicative variable candidate to explain country growth difference correlations with high 
tariffs. Evidence show that late 19
th
 century European tariffs protected, as in the case of 
USA, labour intensive manufactures, such as cotton textiles and leather, rather than capital-
intensive manufactures. Such a tariff could have redistributed income from capital to labour 
and thereby reduced the incentive to accumulate capital but in general terms investment 
goods protection in Europe have not been proven to be very harmful to capital 
accumulation  and economic growth.  
Figures 2 to 5 gives some sense of the unconditional relationship between tariffs 
and growth. So, In one side, rich European countries growth is associated with total tariff 
but not with manufacture tariff increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans countries 
growth appear negatively associated either with total than with manufacture tariff increase. 
In this section we introduce new evidence and arguments to clarify this puzzle on the tariff 
growth mechanism.  
Table 3 examine this relationship more formally regressing the annual growth in 
real per capita GDP on the initial level of tariff and GDP per capita. It is used different 
tariff measures and other control variables (1) initial Total Average Tariff rate for 1870 
(nttot70), (2) The estimated Weighted Manufacture Tariff Average for 1876 (ntmanu75); 
(3)The estimated Unweighted Manufacture Tariff Average for 1876 (untmanu75); (4) The 
Bairoch Manufacture Tariff Average for 1875 (ntmanu75b); (5) Population in 1870 
(pop70) and the estimated Weighted Manufacture Tariff Average (ntmanu75); (6) the 
Agricultural Share in total GDP in 1870 (agrshare), population (pop70) and Total Average 
Tariff in 1870 (nttot70). The European sample is about 15 countries but a dummy is used 
being 0 for Core 1 for Peripheral countries (see note 7). 
                                                 
16
 Spain in 1877 protected consumer manufacture goods around 25% and  imported machinary 8,7 per cent. Italy in 
1877 had very low tariffs for consumer goods 5,4%  and around 8% for machinery (unweighted data).   
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            Table 3 
Regressions on Tariffs and Growth 
Regression ( 1 )  
  
Regression ( 2 )  
 
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
  
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
 
   
      
  
 without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1    
without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1 
-0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004  -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0011 
gdp70 (-1.66) (-3.53)* (1.85)  gdp70 (-0.66) (-4.56)** (2.48) 
-0.0297 0.0215 -0.0210  -0.0064 -0.0161 0.0053 
nttot70 (-2.50)* (1.17) (-3.07)*  ntmanu75 (-0.97) (-1.74) (0.95) 
1.9781 2.2458 0.9716  1.6145 3.2395 -0.3417 
Constant (5.52)** (6.41)** (2.82)*  Constant (3.52)** (6.89)** (-0.50) 
Observations 15 8 7  Observations 15 8 7 
R-squared 0.34 0.83 0.87  R-squared 0.07 0.86 0.65 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
         
         
   
      
Regression ( 3 )  
  
Regression ( 4 )  
 
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
  
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
 
         
  
without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1    
without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1 
-0.0003 -0.0007 0.0008  gdp70 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 
gdp70 (-1.46) (-3.84)* (1.65)    (-0.54) (3.53)* (0.47) 
-0.0201 -0.0261 0.0001  ntmanu75b -0.0129 -0.0038 -0.0201 
untmanu75 (-1.89) (-1.31) (0.01)    (-0.78) (-0.28) (-0.73) 
2.0372 3.1676 0.1876  Constant 1.4969 2.5292 0.9791 
Constant (4.28)** (5.76)** (0.24)    (3.73)** (5.85)** (0.85) 
Observations 15 8 7  Observations 14 7 7 
R-squared 0.23 0.84 0.57  R-squared 0.05 0.85 0.62 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
         
         
Regression ( 5 ) 
   
Regression ( 6 ) 
  
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
  
Dependen Variable: gdpgr70 
 
         
  
without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1    
without 
Dummy Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1 
-0.0002 -0.0008 0.0010  -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0004 
gdp70 (-0.80) (-4.19)* (2.09)  gdp70 (-1.43) (-1.61) (.) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
pop70 (0.53) (0.41) (0.32)  pop70 (0.26) (-0.61) (.) 
-0.0094 -0.0168 0.0034  -0.0046 -0.0149 0.0409 
ntmanu75 (-1.07) (-1.63) (0.38)  agrshare (-0.28) (-0.74) (.) 
1.7074 3.2414 -0.2753  -0.0440 0.0157 -0.0500 
Constant (3.39)** (6.29)** (-0.34)  nttot70 (-2.93)* (0.66) (.) 
Observations 15 8 7  2.9793 3.8116 -0.7925 
R-squared 0.10 0.87 0.66  Constant (1.79) (1.77) (.) 
     Observations 13 8 5 
     R-squared 0.55 0.85 1.00 
     Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
     * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Sources and variables. Table 3 Appendix B 
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Regression (1) finds a low negative (and significant at 5%) relationship between 
total tariffs and growth in Europe. This negative relationship is higher (and significant at 
5%) in the European periphery, as the unconditional association of figure 3 showed. The 
rich European countries would have a positive but not significant relationship between 
tariffs and growth, being backwardness ( or lower initial levels of per capita GDP) a more 
significant explicative variable to explain faster rates growth. A similar negative 
relationship between weighted manufacture tariffs and growth is found in regression (2), 
but this association is not significant. Further more, backwardness is significant at 1% to 
explain growth in rich Europe, meanwhile, higher manufacture tariffs have a strong, but not 
statistically significant, negative association with faster growth. This negative relationship 
between manufacture tariffs and growth is found very soft in the total sample of European 
countries and stronger in core European countries in regressions (3), (4) and (5) with R-
squared always superior to 0,85 but never statistically significant.  In the same regressions 
manufacture tariffs and growth in peripheral Europe appear with a positive sign with R-
squared around 0,60, no statistically significant and very low t statistics values.  The only 
exception to this positive relationship between manufacture tariff and growth in peripheral 
countries is found in regression (4),  that use manufacture weighted tariff average estimated 
by Bairoch. As figures 4 and 5 showed for the simple association between both variables 
manufacture show a low but negative association even for peripheral Europe between 
manufacture tariffs and growth.  
Regression (6) introduce  two, additional structural variable control the Agricultural GDP 
share and Population, in relation with regression (1) The statistical significance of the 
negative relationship between total tariff and growth is confirmed with improved 
coefficients and the expected negative sign between lower agricultural share and faster 
growth.  Regresion (6) also confirm the positive relationship, between total tariffs and 
growth found for rich European countries in regression 1 (and despite the scarcity of data 
also the  negative for poor Europe):  
The whole regression exercise suggest a negative relationship between tariffs and 
growth in Europe. This negative relationship is stronger in the peripheral Europe but more 
for total average than for manufacture tariffs.  Rich European countries, on the contrary, 
had a positive relationship between total tariff average and growth but a negative in the 
case of manufacture tariffs and growth. An argument that would allow explain in part this 
puzzle came from figure 1, and is related with the bigger share of fiscal tariffs in total tariff 
average in rich Europe than in poor Europe. Fiscal tariffs influence more rich European 
 16 
tariff average but are not related with an import substitution policy.  That’s would explain 
the negative relationship with growth of manufacture tariffs in rich Europe too.  
 
Conclusions  
This paper discusses the main criticisms that make the use of the average tariff indicator to 
establish a causal relationship between tariffs and growth in late 19
th
 century Europe especially 
vulnerable. Total tariff average may not only provide little information for interpreting the tariff 
mechanism causation to growth but perhaps an erroneous one. Historical events as agricultural 
protection reaction in the aftermath of the Great grain invasion (O`Rourke (1997), European 
Offshoots trade tax dependence or the big share of exotic tariff goods in total tariff revenue in rich 
European countries between 1870 to 1914 ( Tena 2001, 2005 ), suggest the use of alternative 
indicators to the conventional total tariff average in tariff growth correlation equation or even for 
unconditional association. If we accept that the relevant question for Europe late nineteenth 
century, is:  was protection a successful policy to foster industrialization? Then we should be more 
interested in the correlation between industrial tariff average and total factor productivity increase. 
GDP per person growth has probably a good correlation with total productivity increase in the 
long run, but perhaps total tariff average is not a good proxy for an industrial protection strategy.  
First results show a negative relationship between tariffs and growth in Europe, despite is 
founded a relevant  disparities between total and manufacture tariff association with growth in 
Core and Peripheral European countries. In one side, rich European countries growth is associated 
with total tariff but not with manufacture tariff increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans 
countries growth appear negatively associated either with total than with manufacture tariff 
increase. 
Evidence showed in this paper appear quite contrary to Bairoch (1977,1989,1996) 
traditional hypothesis on the positive role that protection played to foster Continental 
Europe industrialization before First War World. Nevertheless, the paper suggest additional 
research to explicit the relation between industrial, agricultural and fiscal tariffs to clear the 
mechanism of causation between tariffs and growth. As Irwin (2001) mention correlation 
between tariffs and growth are only suggestive of causality. This regression exercise do not 
prove any causal relationship between tariffs and slow growth but put in question the good 
reputation of 19
th
 century protectionism to foster European Industrialization.  
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APPENDIX A 
ESTIMATION OF THE MANUFACTURE  EUROPEAN TARIFF LEVEL AVERAGE IN 
1876 and 1902. 
 
There are some well know contemporaneous estimation of comparative manufactures tariffs 
average by country before First War World.   League of Nations(1927) and  Liepmann (1938) offer 
Comparative index numbers  for more than a dozen of countries in 1913.  Another important work, less 
commonly  used by economic historians, is that of the Board of Trade (1903) that offers an estimation for 
20 countries of 32 manufacture articles tariff average. This work use British export prices and weight 
manufacture and semimanufacture tariff average by country  according to British world export industrial 
structure. For  previous years, with the exception of  Bairoch (1989), there are no  comparative studies by 
countries of industrial tariff levels.  Bairoh (1989) offers a table of comparative industrial tariff average in 
1875 for 14 countries ( “Author`s  computation based on tariff duties and prices for 14 different 
manufactures products”p.42). This work does not offer information on the manufacture items included and 
the method used (tariffs, prices and wheight). But the year elected, the number of countries and products are 
coincident with the Board of Trade (1877) study signed by Robert Giffen  that is also the source of the 
present estimation. 
 This Estimation departure from the information offered the original Board of Trade (1877) data  on 
prices and tariffs for 14 countries and 15 manufacture articles. This work has been complemented with own 
estimations on prices and duties for other 9 manufacture articles obtained from the Annual Statement of 
Trade (1876) and Board of Trade (1870) study on British export prices and duties levied by the same 14 
European Countries. Second, original Board of Trade (1903) work that offer, from British export prices 
sources, data for 30 different manufacture products, and duties for 25 countries national sources for the 
respective products.   
The estimations that follow bellow measure the incidence of import tariffs on the principal 
manufactures exported from United Kingdom. Both  estimations offers some  technical vicious and virtues. 
On the vicious side, this estimation use British f.ob. export prices instead of national c.i.f import prices in 
the denominator for the estimation of  tariff average (this would imply an over bias but in the case of 
manufacture articles with low freight factors practical implementation of fob instead of cif prices makes 
little difference in the final results)
17
. On the virtues side, one should take account that many peripheral 
countries declared British export values are closer to real market price in frontier than the low accurate 
official import unit values estimations
18
. Second,  in this estimation  advalorem tariffs are weighted by the 
structure of British manufacture export to the world, and not by the particular country manufacture import 
demand. This seems inappropriate but has the virtuous of overcome the well known “index number 
problem” of the conventional tariff average weighted by import values. 
19
 
This method (which is that adopted bellow ) has the advantage of applying a uniform standard to all 
countries, both as regards the list of articles on which the duties are calculated, and the relative “weight” 
attached to each article. This imply, on one side, a no rigours decision, because you apply an artificial 
standard  import demand structure to every country. On the other side, this method assume a free trade 
manufacture import demand do not affected by tariffs. It offers an uniform and explicit tariff average by 
country that it is complemented by an additional unweighted average.
20
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 League of Nations (1927) used cif import and fob export prices and conclude. “ the results obtained under the two 
systems are in fair accordance , but those from method B (fob export prices) tend to be slightly higher (on the average 
circa 8 per cent)”. p.6.  
18
 See Federico- Tena (1991); Tena (1992) 
19
 “ The objection to employing import values ratios rest on the fact that those ratios are themselves directly influenced 
by the duties imposed. If a duty on any article proved to be prohibitive, there would be no imports and no weight could 
be given to it”. League of Nations (1927), p.7.   
20
 For this work we assume that British manufature export structure, at least for 1876, was closer to world demand 
structure than in  1913 so weighted an unweighted average are used. The unweighted average was recommended by 
Loveday in his work on “tariff levels” League of Nations (1927) and was suported also by Liepman (1938). League of 
Nations (1927) estimated a tariff manufacture unweighted average using 110 manufacture articles (leaving out 
semimanufactures).  Liepman (1938) used  unweighted average of  fob export prices for 144 products of which used a 
separate index for semimanufacture (44 articles) and manufactures (62 manufacture articles). This can be considered  a 
better approximation to the 1913 and 1926 free trade world export demand.  
 19 
The technique consists first to make a list of the principal classes of goods and to “weight” each group 
roughly, according to its comparative importance in British exports. Out of each group a few leading 
articles or classes of articles are then chosen as representative of the whole group, an the average tariff 
rates of duty on these leading articles for each country are taken as fairly representative of the tariff 
treatment of the whole group. Those tariffs should be uniformed to monetary, capacity, mass or weight 
to British unit values measurement of the corresponding articles (for especial calculations see sources 
bellow point (a), (b), (c) ). 
 
 
Sources:  
 
Prices and manufature export values  1876 : 
from: Import Duties on British Goods (Foreign Countries) Return of the Estimated Average ad valorem Rate of Impot 
Duty Levied in The Principal European Countries and in the United States, on certain Articles of British Produce or 
Manufacture. British Parlamentary Papers vol LXXVI.181. Session 1877. 
Except for Cotton Manufactures and Woollen and Worsted Manufactures, that have been estimated, for the year 1877, 
from the Annual Statement of Trade: Return of the Values of the Exports of British and Irish Produce 1854-1880.  
British Parlamentary Papers vol LXVI; Session 1882. 
Prices and manufacture export values  1902 : “The comparative incidence of foreign and 
colonial Inport tariffs on the principal Classes of Manufactures Exported from the United 
Kingdom. British Parlamentary Papers vol.  XXXIV, 1905; pp.285-315. 
 
 
Advalorem rates &Import Duties 1876: 
From: Import Duties on British Goods (Foreign Countries) Return of the Estimated Average ad valorem Rate of Impot 
Duty Levied in The Principal European Countries and in the United States, on certain Articles of British Produce or 
Manufacture. Parlamentary Papers vol LXXVI.181. Session 1877. 
Except for Cotton Manufactures and Woollen and Worsted Manufactures, custom tariffs for the 14 countries came 
from: "Return of Rates of Import Duty levied by Tariffs of European Countries and United States on Principal Articles 
of Merchandize, 1860, 1870, Parlamentary Papers Vol. LXI.337; Session 1870. 
Advalorem rates &Import Duties 1902: “The comparative incidence of foreign and colonial 
Inport tariffs on the principal Classes of Manufactures Exported from the United Kingdom. 
British Parlamentary Papers vol.  XXXIV, 1905; pp.285-315. 
 
Technical specification for some articles used for 1876 and 1902 
(a) In the same way than in cotton piece goods cotton yarns 40yards to lb has been assumed see British 
Parlamentary Papers (1905).p.291. 
(b) Cotton piece goods are entered in UK Trade Accounts by the yard whereas most duties are imposed by 
weight, or graduated according to the weight per square metre of the tissues. After inquiry, an "average 
account" of 5 yards  to lb has been assumed. See British Parlamentary Papers (1905), p.291. 
(c) In the case of Woollen and Worsted Piece Goods average weights have been estimated  varying from 18ozs 
to the yard for heavy broad woollen piece goods and worsted coatings to 5ozs to the yard for Mixed Worsted 
Stuffs. See British Parlamentary Papers (1905) p.291. 
(d) Equivalence for measurement of Mass or Weight: - 112Lb = 0,4535Kg; 100yard  =  20Lb; 1CWT = 112,02 
Lb;1onz = 1/16 Lb. 
(e) Standard equivalence for monetary units:1 Pound = 240d; 1shilling = 20d. 
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Table 1 
Groups, articles and prices taken as representatives of British manufacture exports 1876 
Group  Representative Articles British Exports 1876 Value of British Exports Average export   
  Wheight attached of these groups of  values of these 
  to each group manufactures in 1876 Articles 1876 
  forming the average (%) (Thousand Pounds)  
1 2 3 4 5 
Cotton yarns (a)  10,1% 12782  
 cotton single unbleached   9d/Lb 
 cotton single undyed   20d/Lb 
 cotton double undyed   23d/Lb 
     
Cotton Manufactures(b)     
 Cotton piece bleached  24,7% 31454 1988,08 d/Cwt (d) 
 Cotton piece printed  14,5% 18494 2661,93 d/Cwt (d) 
     
Wollen &Worsted Yarn Wollen and worsted yarn undyed 3,5% 4417 60d/Lb 
     
Wollen&Worsted Manufact© Woolen stuffs all wool   14,6% 18603 4594,35d/Cw (d) 
     
Linen Yarn (Lbs)  1,1% 1450  
 Linen yarns unbleached    20d/Lb 
 linen yarns single   26d/Lb 
 linen yarns double   46d/Lb 
     
Silk (Throwns) Silk Thrown 0,9% 1081 800d/Lb 
     
Jute Manufactures     
 Jute Canvas and Sacking  1,0% 1212 4d/Lb 
     
Iron and Steel Manufactures     
 Pig Iron  2,2% 2842 1200d/Ton 
 Bars &Angle 13,7% 17382 1680d/Ton 
 Rails including steel rails 8,0% 10225 1680d/Ton 
     
Copper Manufactures     
 Copper lingots, Cakes, Slabs 0,8% 983 19200d/Ton 
     
Leather and Manufactures thereof 2,3% 2945  
 Ox & Cow Hides   26d/lb 
 Calf Skins   46d/lb 
     
Alkaly Chemichals products   1,7% 2223  
 Bicarbobate Soda   228d/Cwt 
 Soda caustic   280d/Cwt 
 Crystals of Soda   82d/Cwt 
     
Paper Manufactures  0,8% 1020  
 Paper for writing   6d/Lb 
 Paper for printing   4d/Lb 
  ∑ 100%   
Total of Above Groups (Sample)  71% 127115  
Total British Manufact& partially Manufact Exports 100% 179540  
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Table2 
Manufacture Weighted and Unweighted Tariff Average  Estimated for European Core Countries in 
1876 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Core 1876 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Holland 
 advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem 
Articles duty duty duty duty duty duty 
1876 % % % % % % 
Cotton Manufactures       
Cotton piece bleached 24% 12% 14% 12% 22% 5% 
Cotton piece printed 45% 18% 56% 55% 45% 5% 
       
Cooton yarns undyed 9% 10% 7% 10% 7% 0% 
cotton single unbleached 10% 13% 9% 13% 7% 0% 
cotton single undyed 9% 10% 6% 10% 8% 0% 
cotton double undyed 8% 8% 5% 8% 7% 0% 
       
Linen Yarn (Lbs) 3% 0% 4%  3% 0% 
Linen yarns unbleached  2% 0% 6%  2% 0% 
linen yarns single 4% 0% 4%  4% 0% 
linen yarns double 2% 0% 3%  2% 0% 
       
Silk throwns 0% 3% 4% 0% 0% 0% 
       
Woolen stuffs all wool   2% 3% 3%  1% 0% 
       
JuteCanvas and Sacking  4% 10% 26% 19% 5% 5% 
       
Iron and Manufacture 29% 6% 6% 35% 0% 0% 
Pig Iron (l/Lbs) 17% 7% 0% 27% 0% 0% 
Bars &Angle(l/Tons) 35% 5% 9% 35% 0% 0% 
Rails including stel 35% 5% 9% 43% 0% 0% 
       
Copper lingots, Cakes, Slabs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
       
Wollen&Worsted Manufact 12% 10% 9% 10% 10% 5% 
Wollen&Worsted manufc. All wool 12% 10% 9% 10% 10% 5% 
       
Leather and Manufactures 4% 4% 10% 2% 4% 0% 
Ox & Cow Hides 4% 4% 11% 3% 4% 0% 
Calf Skins 3% 3% 9% 2% 3% 0% 
       
Alkaly Chemichals products  25% 0% 0% 17% 16% 0% 
Bicarbobate Soda 26% 0% 0% 15% 7% 0% 
Soda caustic 29% 0% 0% 19% 22% 0% 
Crystals of Soda 19% 0% 0% 18% 18% 0% 
       
Paper Manufactures 6% 4% 14% 9% 5% 5% 
paper for writing 5% 3% 11% 7% 5% 5% 
paper for printing 7% 5% 16% 10% 5% 5% 
       
Manufacture protection unweighted 12,4% 5,8% 10,0% 13,4% 7,0% 1,5% 
Manufacture protection weighted  23,9% 9,8% 16,3% 23,0% 14,7% 2,8% 
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Table 3 
Manufacture Weighted and Unweighted Tariff Average  Estimated for European Peripheral 
Countries in1876 
1876 
European Peryphery 1876 Hungary Italy Norway Portugal Russia Spain Sweden 
 advalorem Advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem advalorem 
Articles duty Duty duty duty duty duty duty 
1876 % % % % % % % 
Cotton Manufactures        
Cotton piece bleached 24% 12% 15% 15% 72% 70% 25% 
Cotton piece printed 45% 23% 46% 122% 217% 84% 51% 
        
Cooton yarns undyed 9% 9% 5% 40% 30% 56% 10% 
cotton single unbleached 10% 10% 3% 38% 38% 61% 13% 
cotton single undyed 9% 9% 3% 45% 29% 55% 10% 
cotton double undyed 8% 7% 4% 37% 23% 51% 8% 
        
Linen Yarn (Lbs) 3% 4% 2% 27% 24% 13% 10% 
Linen yarns unbleached  2% 4% 3% 31% 35% 10% 12% 
linen yarns single 4% 5% 2% 32% 23% 19% 11% 
linen yarns double 2% 3% 2% 19% 14% 11% 8% 
        
Silk throwns 0% 0% 1% 5% 1% 4%  
        
Woolen stuffs all wool   2% 6% 2% 47% 13% 31% 4% 
        
JuteCanvas and Sacking  4% 13% 15% 44% 10%  0% 
        
Iron and Manufacture 29% 20% 0% 5% 32% 49% 0% 
Pig Iron (l/Lbs) 17% 0% 0 5% 17% 34% 0% 
Bars &Angle(l/Tons) 35% 52% 0% 5% 50% 68% 0% 
Rails including stel 35% 7% 0% 5% 28% 46% 0% 
        
Copper lingots, Cakes, Slabs 0% 2% 0% 1% 7% 11% 0% 
        
Wollen&Worsted Manufact 12% 11% 11% 22% 34% 16% 11% 
Wollen&Worsted manufc. All wool 12% 11% 11% 22% 34% 16% 11% 
        
Leather and Manufactures 4% 4% 4% 6% 31% 27% 7% 
Ox & Cow Hides 4% 4% 5% 6% 26% 30% 5% 
Calf Skins 3% 3% 3% 5% 35% 23% 8% 
        
Alkaly Chemichals products  25% 7% 0% 88% 20% 20% 0% 
Bicarbobate Soda 26% 2% 0% 26% 17% 13% 0% 
Soda caustic 29% 16% 0% 168% 21% 11% 0% 
Crystals of Soda 19% 2% 0% 71% 23% 37% 0% 
        
Paper Manufactures 6% 9% 7% 26% 53% 15% 13% 
paper for writing 5% 7% 14% 42% 53% 18% 19% 
paper for printing 7% 11% 0% 9% 53% 11% 7% 
        
Total protection unweighted 12,4% 9,5% 6,3% 30,9% 38,4% 32,2% 9,2% 
Total protection weighted  23,9% 17,2% 12,9% 34,2% 69,1% 53,4% 16,8% 
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Table 4 
Groups, articles and prices taken as representatives of British manufacture exports 1902 
 
Group  Representative Articles British Exports 1902 Value of British Exports Average export   
  Wheight atached of these groups of  values of these 
  To each group manufactures in 1902 Articles 1902 
  forming the average (%) (Thousand Pounds)  
  % Mill Pounds export prices 
Cotton Manufactures 39% 65,00  
 Cotton piece unbleached(d/yards)   2,01d per yards 
 Cotton piece bleached(d/yard)   2,46 d per yard 
 Cotton piece printed(d/yard)   2,68d per yard 
 Cotton piece dyed(d/yard)   3,46 d per yard 
Cotton Yarns  4% 7,40  
 Cotton thread for sewing(d/yard)   26,89 d per pound 
 Cotton yarn Grey(d/lb)   10,49 d per pound 
 Cotton yarn bleached or dyed(d/lb)  11,23d per pound 
Wollen worsted manufactures 9% 15,30  
 Woollen pice heavy all wool(d/yard)  52,57d per yard 
 Woollen piece heavy mixed(d/yard)  22,65 d per yard 
 Wollen pice light all wool(d/yard)   36,22d per yard 
 Woolem pice light mixed   15,23 d per yard 
 Worsted coating all wool(d/yard)   47,27d per yard 
 Worsted coating mixed(d/yard)   27,5 d per yard 
 Worsted stuffs all wool(d/yard)   11,57d per yard 
 Worsted stuffs mixed(d/yard)   9,72d per yard 
Wollen worsted yarns 3% 5,00  
 Worsted yarn(d/lb)   16,07 d per pound 
Linen manufactures  3% 5,40  
 Linen pice goods(d/yard)   5,7 d per yard 
Machinary hardware &c 12% 21,00  
 Textil Machinary(l/Ton)   49 l per ton 
 Locomotive Machinary(l/Ton)   45 l per ton 
 Sewing Machinary(l/Ton)   135 l per ton 
Iron and Steel manufactures 16% 29,20  
 Pig iron(s/Ton)   64,75s per ton 
 Rails(l/Ton)   5,44l per ton 
 Galvanised corrugated sheets(l/Ton)  12,48l per ton 
 Tinplates(l/Ton)   13,89 l per ton 
 Steel bars, angles,shapes(l/Ton)   11,57l per ton 
Ships  3% 5,90  
 Ships(l/Ton)   12 l per ton gros 
Apparel  4% 6,30  
 Wollen clothing(s/lb)   6,67 s per lb 
Leather and Manufactures therof 2% 4,40  
 Boots and shoes of leather(s/doz)  48,09s per doz pairs 
Chemicals  5% 9,60  
 Sulphate of copper(s/cwt)   19,3 s per cw 
 Caustic soda(s/cwt)   9,7 s per cw 
 Bleaching powder(s/cwt)   6,14 s per cw 
  ∑ 100%   
Groups above 77% 174,50  
Total manufacture    
British exports  100% 227,50  
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Table 5 
Manufacture Weighted and Unweighted Tariff Average for European Core Countries in    
1902 
 
European Core 1902 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Holand Switzerland 
Manufacture Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem 
Articles Duty duty duty Duty duty duty duty 
 % % % % % % % 
COTTON MANUFACTURES 55% 25% 33% 46% 44% 5% 10% 
Cotton piece unbleached(d/yards) 54% 28% 15% 49% 43% 5% 4% 
Cotton piece bleached(d/yard) 53% 25% 24% 48% 44% 5% 14% 
Cotton piece printed(d/yard) 65% 27% 60% 51% 49% 5% 13% 
Cotton piece dyed(d/yard) 47% 22% 32% 36% 38% 5% 10% 
COTTON YARNS 15% 7% 9% 77% 13% 0% 4% 
Cotton thread for sewing(d/yard) 14% 8% 3% 197% 14% 0% 6% 
Cotton yarn Grey(d/lb) 14% 6% 7% 14% 9% 0% 3% 
Cotton yarn bleached or dyed(d/lb) 17% 7% 18% 20% 15% 0% 5% 
WOLLEN WORSTED MANUFACTURES 27% 11% 26% 17% 28% 5% 9% 
Woollen pice heavy all wool(d/yard) 19% 10% 17% 17% 16% 5% 5% 
Woollen piece heavy mixed(d/yard) 27% 10% 40% 16% 37% 5% 12% 
Wollen pice light all wool(d/yard) 15% 10% 14% 11% 13% 5% 6% 
Woolem pice light mixed 36% 10% 33% 20% 30% 5% 14% 
Worsted coating all wool(d/yard) 21% 10% 19% 19% 17% 5% 6% 
Worsted coating mixed(d/yard) 22% 10% 33% 13% 30% 5% 10% 
Worsted stuffs all wool(d/yard) 39% 15% 26% 20% 39% 5% 11% 
Worsted stuffs mixed(d/yard) 38% 15% 26% 21% 39% 5% 11% 
WOLLEN AND WORSTED YARNS 7% 5% 9% 18% 3% 0% 2% 
Worsted yarn(d/lb) 7% 5% 9% 18% 3% 0% 2% 
LINEN MANUFACTURES 25% 10% 14% 53% 17% 5% 9% 
Linen pice goods(d/yard) 25% 10% 14% 53% 17% 5% 9% 
MACHINARY HARDWARE &c 15% 3% 6% 9% 8% 0% 5% 
Textil Machinary(l/Ton) 8% 3% 10% 4% 5% 0% 3% 
Locomotive Machinary(l/Ton) 19% 4% 2% 14% 9% 0% 9% 
Sewing Machinary(l/Ton) 19% 1% 5% 11% 9% 0% 1% 
IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURES 43% 5% 10% 32% 18% 0% 5% 
Pig iron(s/Ton) 20% 3% 0% 19% 16% 0% 1% 
Rails(l/Ton) 47% 8% 10% 45% 23% 0% 4% 
Galvanised corrugated sheets(l/Ton) 65% 10% 18% 39% 20% 0% 10% 
Tinplates(l/Ton) 59% 0% 17% 35% 18% 0% 9% 
Steel bars, angles,shapes(l/Ton) 22% 4% 5% 21% 11% 0% 2% 
SHIPS 4% 0% 3% 1% 0% 1% 7% 
Ships(l/Ton) 4% 0% 3% 1% 0% 1% 7% 
APPAREL 15% 10% 11% 12% 20% 5% 6% 
Wollen clothing(s/lb) 15% 10% 11% 12% 20% 5% 6% 
LEATHER AND MANUFACTURES THEROF 11% 1% 25% 22% 11% 5% 5% 
Boots and shoes of leather(s/doz) 11% 1% 25% 22% 11% 5% 5% 
CHEMICALS 17% 0% 0% 19% 15% 0% 1% 
Sulphate of copper(s/cwt) 8% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 1% 
Caustic soda(s/cwt) 31% 0% 0% 27% 21% 0% 1% 
Bleaching powder(s/cwt) 12% 0% 0% 23% 25% 0% 2% 
        
Manufacture Protection Weighted 36% 13% 20% 33% 26% 3% 7% 
Manufacture Protection Unweighted 28% 9% 16% 29% 21% 2% 7% 
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Table 6 
Manufacture Weighted and Unweighted Tariff Average  Estimated for European Peripheral 
Countries in 1902 
1902 
European Pheriphery 1902 Hungary Italy Norway Portugal  Roumania Russia Spain Sweden 
Manufacture Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem Advalorem 
Articles duty duty duty duty duty duty duty duty 
 % % % % % % % % 
COTTON MANUFACTURES 55% 37% 25% 89% 17% 228% 118% 39% 
Cotton piece unbleached(d/yards) 54% 34% 12% 49% 21% 207% 145% 30% 
Cotton piece bleached(d/yard) 53% 33% 20% 47% 16% 268% 119% 44% 
Cotton piece printed(d/yard) 65% 52% 50% 146% 19% 246% 124% 50% 
Cotton piece dyed(d/yard) 47% 29% 18% 113% 13% 191% 84% 32% 
COTTON YARNS 15% 17% 7% 52% 7% 62% 53% 10% 
Cotton thread for sewing(d/yard) 14% 18% 5% 68% 6% 39% 40% 9% 
Cotton yarn Grey(d/lb) 14% 14% 6% 39% 5% 70% 62% 9% 
Cotton yarn bleached or dyed(d/lb) 17% 19% 10% 49% 10% 76% 58% 12% 
WOLLEN WORSTED MANUFACTURES 27% 29% 20% 178% 19% 143% 102% 34% 
Woollen pice heavy all wool(d/yard) 19% 15% 13% 115% 13% 95% 99% 21% 
Woollen piece heavy mixed(d/yard) 27% 35% 30% 268% 29% 220% 139% 49% 
Wollen pice light all wool(d/yard) 15% 14% 10% 97% 10% 76% 80% 18% 
Woolem pice light mixed 36% 33% 25% 230% 24% 182% 115% 43% 
Worsted coating all wool(d/yard) 21% 23% 14% 128% 14% 105% 110% 25% 
Worsted coating mixed(d/yard) 22% 39% 25% 220% 24% 181% 115% 43% 
Worsted stuffs all wool(d/yard) 39% 35% 20% 183% 19% 143% 84% 34% 
Worsted stuffs mixed(d/yard) 38% 35% 19% 181% 19% 142% 69% 34% 
WOLLEN AND WORSTED YARNS 7% 22% 8% 118% 22% 60% 99% 10% 
Worsted yarn(d/lb) 7% 22% 8% 118% 22% 60% 99% 10% 
LINEN MANUFACTURES 25% 21% 18% 98% 23% 310% 79% 29% 
Linen pice goods(d/yard) 25% 21% 18% 98% 23% 310% 79% 29% 
MACHINARY HARDWARE &c 15% 10% 0% 8% 0% 26% 17% 10% 
Textil Machinary(l/Ton) 8% 7% 0% 9% 0% 28% 15% 10% 
Locomotive Machinary(l/Ton) 19% 13% 0% 13% 0% 39% 14% 10% 
Sewing Machinary(l/Ton) 19% 9% 0% 2% 0% 10% 21% 10% 
IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURES 43% 38% 0% 5% 5% 91% 40% 7% 
Pig iron(s/Ton) 20% 13% 0% 4% 0% 91% 25% 0% 
Rails(l/Ton) 47% 45% 0% 8% 0% 90% 33% 0% 
Galvanised corrugated sheets(l/Ton) 65% 65% 0% 6% 13% 122% 52% 27% 
Tinplates(l/Ton) 59% 47% 0% 5% 12% 110% 58% 0% 
Steel bars, angles,shapes(l/Ton) 22% 21% 0% 4% 0% 42% 33% 10% 
SHIPS 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 
Ships(l/Ton) 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 
APPAREL 15% 16% 15% 202% 22% 82% 62% 20% 
Wollen clothing(s/lb) 15% 16% 15% 202% 22% 82% 62% 20% 
LEATHER AND MANUFACTURES 
THEROF 11% 14% 33% 281% 54% 171% 119% 38% 
Boots and shoes of leather(s/doz) 11% 14% 33% 281% 54% 171% 119% 38% 
CHEMICALS 17% 4% 0% 11% 0% 88% 11% 3% 
Sulphate of copper(s/cwt) 8% 4% 0% 6% 0% 41% 2% 10% 
Caustic soda(s/cwt) 31% 8% 0% 24% 0% 101% 16% 0% 
Bleaching powder(s/cwt) 12% 0% 0% 4% 0% 123% 16% 0% 
         
Manufacture Protection Weighted 36% 27% 14% 75% 13% 144% 77% 24% 
Manufacture Protection Unweighted 28% 24% 11% 88% 13% 118% 68% 20% 
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APPENDIX B 
 
              Table 2 
Manufacture and Total Tariff  Ratio between 1870 and 1913 in Europe 
 
 
Bairoch 
Tariff 
Average1875 
Tariff 
Average1870 Ratio  
Tariff 
Average 
1913 
Tariff 
Average 
1913 Ratio 
1870`s Manufact. (1)  Total (2)  (3) = (1) / (2) 1913 
  
Manufact.(4) Total (5) (6) = (4) / (5) 
Austria 15 5.2 2.83 Austria 14.6 22.8 0.64 
Belgium 9 1.5 6 Belgium 8.7 14.2 0.61 
Denmark 15 12 1.25 Denmark* 14 9 1.55 
France 12 5.8 2.07 France  12.9 23.6 0.55 
Germany 4 7.3 0.55 Germany 8.5 16.7 0.51 
Netherlands 3 0.6 5 
Netherland
s*  3  
Switzerland 4 3.6 1.11 
Switzerlan
d 7.6 10.5 0.72 
UK 0.1 5.3 0.019 UK* 0.1* 4.2 (2) 0.02 
EU(Core)    EU (Core)    
        
Hungary 15 5.2 2.83 Hungary 14.6 2.,8 0.64 
Italy 8 11.1 0.72 Italy 12.6 24.8 0.51 
Norway 2 11.8 0,17 Norway*  11.4  
Portugal 20 32.4 0.62 Portugal(2)  24.7  
Russia 15 19 0,79 Russia 79 7.5 1.09 
Spain 15.3 16.6 0.92 Spain 35.7 37 0,96 
Sweden 3 10.3 0,29 Sweden 22,5 27.6 0.82 
EU(Peripher
y)    Serbia 15 22.2 0.68 
    Rumania 22.5 30.3 0.74 
    Bulgaria 18.7 22.8 0.82 
    Finland 36.4 35 1.04 
 
Sources : (1) Bairoch (1989), Table 5 p.42; (2) Mitchell (1981) Custom revenue & Import value; 
(4) Liepman (1938) Table IV A p.413 Industrial Manufactured goods potential tariff levels;  (5) 
Liepman (1938) Table IV B p.415 General potential levels with fiscal goods included. * League of 
Nations(1927) arithmetic averages sample. 
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Table 2 
Wheigted (NT) and unweighted  (UNT) Industrial and Total tariff average for Spain and Italy  
1870-1930                    
  NT 
Spain 
NT 
Italy 
 UNT 
Spain 
UNT 
Italy 
1877 Total 12.7 7.3  17.7 6,8 
 Industry 17.6 6.5  22.4 5.4 
1889 Total 11.0 17.6  16.7 16,9 
 Industry 13,8 16.9  17.6 15.6 
1897 Total 14.6 18.5  26.3 16.1 
 Industry 18.4 13.2  32.4 15.2 
1913 Total 14.9 9.6  25.2 12.7 
 Industry 15.5 9.3  23.6 11.9 
1926 Total 15.5 11.9  26.6 13.7 
 Industry 26.0 15.0  35.9 15.7 
Sources: Spain: Tena (1999); Italy: Federico-Tena (1998) 
 
Table 3 
Regresión data on tariff and growth 
  (1)          (2)             (3)              (4)                (5)                   (6)             (7)             (8)                
 GDPGR70 GDP70 NTTOT70 NTMANU75 UNTMANU75 NTMAN75B POP70 AGRSHARE DUMY 
AU 1,5 1.863 5,2 24 12 14,7 4520 65 0 
BEL 1,1 2.692 1,5 10 6 9 5096 43 0 
FRA 1,5 1.876 5,8 23 13 12 38440 49 0 
GER 1,6 1.839 7,3 15 7 4 39231 50 0 
SWI 1,7 2.102 3,6 4 4  2655 50 0 
NET 0,9 2.757 0,6 3 2 3 3610 37 0 
UK 1,0 3.190 5,3 0 0 0,1 31400 23 0 
DEN 1,6 2.003 12 16 10 15 1888 52 0 
          
HUN 1,20 1.092 5,2 24 12 15 10155  1 
ITA 1,26 1.499 11,1 17 10 8 27888 62 1 
NOR 1,30 1.432 11,8 13 26 2 1735 53 1 
PORT 0,58 975 32,4 34 31 20 4327 66 1 
RUS 1,06 943 19 69 38 15 88672  1 
SPA 1,25 1.207 16,6 53 32 15,3 16201 66 1 
SWE 1,46 1.662 10,3 17 9 3 4169 54 1 
Sources: (1) GDP per capita Growth; (2) GDP per capita 1870 both form Maddison (2003). (3) 
from Mitchell (1983); (4) Weigted manufactured tariff average, (5) Unweighted Manufacture 
Tariff average Both from Apendix A: Tables 2 and 3. (6) Bairoch Manufacture Tariff Average, (7) 
Population in 1870 from Maddison(2003); (8) Agricultural Share on PIB from Maddison (1991).  
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(1) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + B2 NTTOT70 +ei     
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente     
         
(2) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + B2 NTMANU75 +ei     
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente     
 
(3) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + B2 UNTMANU75 + ei     
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente     
 
(4) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + B2 NTMANU75B +ei     
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente       
 
(5) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + + B2 POP70+ B3 NTMANU75 +ei     
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente     
 
(6) GDPGR70 = Ao + B1 GDP70 + B2 POP70 + B3 AGRSHARE + B4 NTTOT70 +ei   
(a) Sin DUMY y con (b)DUMY 0 y (c) 1 respectivamente 
 
